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ABSTRACT 
 
Randomizing Endowments: An Experimental Study of Rational 
Expectations and Reference-Dependent Preferences* 
 
An important advance in the study of reference-dependent preferences is the discipline 
provided by coherent accounts of reference point formation. Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) 
provide such discipline by positing a reference point grounded in rational expectations. We 
examine the predictions of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) in the context of market experiments 
with probabilistic forced exchange. The experiment tightly tests the predictions of Kőszegi 
and Rabin (2006), as when the probability of forced exchange increases, individuals should 
grow more willing to exchange. This mechanism has the theoretical potential to eliminate and 
even reverse the ‘endowment effect’ (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman 
et al., 1990). Our results uniformly reject these theoretical predictions. In a series of 
experiments with a total of 930 subjects, sellers’ valuations exceed buyers’ valuations under 
all probabilities of forced exchange. In robustness tests where attention is drawn specifically 
to the forced exchange mechanism, the results are directionally more promising for buyers, 
but still reject the main thrust of the theoretical predictions. Our findings suggest a potential 
path forward incorporating failures to completely forecast sensations of gain and loss into 
models of expectations-based reference dependence. 
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), reference-dependent preferences
have been successfully applied to many questions in economics, resolving numerous behav-
ioral anomalies at odds with the standard model.1 Beyond market exchange asymmetries
(Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman et al., 1990), reference-dependent
preferences is argued to rationalize a host of behavior from financial decisions (Odean, 1998;
Thaler et al., 1997; Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Barberis and Huang, 2001; Haigh and List,
2005), to labor supply (Camerer et al., 1997; Fehr and Goette, 2007), to decision-making
under uncertainty (Rabin, 2000,b; Rabin and Thaler, 2001). One critical decision for ap-
plications of reference-dependent preferences is the location of the reference point around
which sensations of gains and losses are felt. Indeed, the reference point can be viewed as
a powerful degree of freedom, permitting reference-dependent preferences to rationalize a
variety of non-standard behaviors.2
A coherent and elegant way of disciplining the model is to assume that reference points
are given by expectations, as proposed by Kőszegi and Rabin (2009, 2007, 2006) (henceforth
KR). Expectations are rational in the sense that an individual can only expect as a reference
point something that his subsequent behavior will indeed fulfill.3 The KR model is able to
1By the standard model we mean one in which the utility function is defined on absolute levels of wealth.
By reference-dependent preferences we mean a utility function defined on changes in wealth with losses
experienced more severely than commensurate gains.
2In the original formulation of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the reference point was left unspecified:
‘So far in this paper, gains and losses were defined by the amounts of money that are obtained
or paid when a prospect is played, and the reference point was taken to be the status quo,
or one’s current assets. Although this is probably true for most choice problems, there are
situations in which gains and losses are coded relative to an expectation or aspiration level
that differs from the status quo.’ (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 286)
In addition to the decision elements indicated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), researchers have suggested
reference points of current brand attributes (Hardie et al., 1993), par on a golf hole (Pope and Schweitzer,
2011), a daily wage target (Camerer et al., 1997), and zero gains and losses in laboratory risk choices.
3The KR model establishes two key innovations beyond models of disappointment aversion (Bell, 1985;
Loomes and Sugden, 1986; Gul, 1991). First, as opposed to a certainty equivalent-based reference point,
each element of the distribution of expected outcomes serves as a possible reference point. Second, the
KR model establishes several key rational expectations equilibrium concepts requiring consistency between
expectations and consumption outcomes in equilibrium.
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accommodate many of the observed anomalies attributed to standard reference dependence,
and has also spurred new applications in macroeconomics (Pagel, 2012, 2013), industrial
organization (Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2004, 2008), and contract theory (de Meza and Webb,
2007; Herweg et al., 2010).
A key element of the KR model is that decision-makers forecast their own sensations of
gains and losses and rationally develop consistent plans of action accordingly. Consider the
standard market exchange asymmetry of an ‘endowment effect’ (Kahneman et al., 1990),
wherein sellers’ valuations for a given object exceed buyers’ valuations. A seller can either
expect to sell or expect not to sell. If he expects not to sell, his reference point is keeping
the object, and he forecasts his sensations of losses when asked to give up the object in
exchange for money. Hence, if he expects not to sell he will require compensation in excess
of the object’s intrinsic value to indeed relinquish it. A similar logic lowers buyers’ valuations
conditional on expecting not to buy.4 Both buyers and sellers, when determining a plan of
action, a valuation, forecast their own sensations of gains and losses for each given reference
point. If a plan of action reinforces the reference point (e.g., a seller expecting not to sell
and indeed not selling), the action can be supported in a rational expectations equilibrium
termed a Personal Equilibrium (PE).5 Hence, in the KR model, if a buyer expects not to
buy and a seller expects not to sell, they can potentially support an endowment effect in a
PE.6
Importantly, this central element of KR has so far not been closely examined. That is,
there is no prior experiment investigating whether behavior is consistent with individuals
forecasting their own sensations of gains and losses following KR’s rational expectations
personal equilibrium concept (see below for more discussion).
4A buyer can either expect to buy or expect not to buy. If he expects not to buy, his reference point is
keeping his money, and he forecasts his sensations of losses when asked to give up money in exchange for the
object. Hence, if he expects not to buy, he will require a price below the object’s intrinsic value to relinquish
his money.
5Our implemented equilibrium concept is Personal Equilibrium (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006). In section 2
we also provide some discussion of the equilibrium refinement concepts, Preferred Personal Equilibrium and
Choice-Acclimating Personal Equilibrium which select among a potential multiplicity of personal equilibria.
6We formalize this result in section 2.
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To provide such an experimental test, we construct a market exchange experiment fol-
lowing Kahneman et al. (1990) with one critical innovation. We introduce a probability of
forced exchange. That is, as in previous exchange experiments, individuals are endowed with
objects (in our case a University mug or CHF 10 ≈ USD 10). Sellers (endowed with mugs)
are asked whether they are willing to sell at candidate market prices. Buyers (endowed
with money) are asked whether they are willing to buy at candidate market prices. As in
Kahneman et al. (1990), buyers willing to buy at the market price or greater, and sellers
willing to sell at the market price or lower have their object or money exchanged. Our
novelty of introducing a forced exchange trading rule influences the setting in an important
way. Demand and supply are elicited, but, regardless of the participants’ preferences, with
probability p exchange will be forced.
The forced exchange presents a dilemma. Buyers and sellers can no longer avoid losses
by keeping their endowment. In particular, for p = 0.5 the reference points of both buyers
expecting not to buy and sellers expecting not to sell must be identical. Both will have
the mug with probability 0.5 or the market price with probability 0.5. Having identical
reference points implies having identical preferences over mugs and money under KR. We
demonstrate that with forced exchange probability 0.5 there is no PE with endowment effect
exchange asymmetries in the KR model. Additionally, we demonstrate that the manipulation
of expectations-based reference points yields both monotonic comparative statics and clear
point predictions. In the KR model, the endowment effect reduces, disappears, and even
reverses as the probability of forced exchange increases from 0 to 0.5 and higher. Further,
because a seller expecting not to sell with a forced exchange probability of 0.25 and a buyer
expecting not to buy with a forced exchange probability of 0.75 carry identical expectations
(both will have the market price with probability 0.25 and a mug with probability 0.75), the
model makes the point prediction that the elicited valuations for the mug must coincide.
We test these predictions in a series of experiments with a total of 930 subjects. We
begin with a baseline replication of Kahneman et al. (1990) with no forced exchange, p = 0.
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Then, p is increased to 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.99, respectively.7 Endowment effect exchange
asymmetries are present in the baseline experiment and remain virtually unaffected by the
introduction of the probability of forced exchange. Contrary to the predictions of the KR
model, the endowment effect is present even with probability 0.5 of forced exchange, and is
maintained rather than reversed at the higher probabilities of 0.75 and 0.99. Furthermore,
we find no support for the model’s point predictions of equal valuations for buyers and sellers
in complementary conditions (e.g., p = 0.25 vs. p = 0.75).
We evaluate the robustness of our results with respect to two features. In a follow-up
experiment, we first explain the probabilistic forced exchange mechanism before showing
subjects the good to be exchanged. This treatment was intended to focus the subjects on
the mechanism first, before they learn about the good. In a further treatment, trade is
determined by a randomly drawn price rather than the standard market-price determination
from Kahneman et al. (1990). This eliminates the possibility that buyers and sellers may
have had differing price expectations (which could affect reservation prices in KR), and the
possibility that buyers and sellers mistakenly believe they have market power (Plott and
Zeiler, 2007). Even with these guards in place, the predictions from KR are still clearly
rejected by our data. Interestingly, at least for the group of buyers, when the focus is put
on the probabilistic forced-exchange mechanism, we do find the qualitative pattern that is
predicted by KR. Still, its magnitude is roughly half of what the model predicts.
One possible interpretation of our results lies in projection bias (Loewenstein et al., 2003).
When anticipating the effects of probabilisitic forced exchange on their valuations, individ-
uals must correctly forecast how their sensations of gains and losses will change. Failure to
completely anticipate future sensations, including those of gains and losses, is the central fea-
ture of projection bias. Such deviations from rational expectations are argued to rationalize
7In addition to testing the predictions, this design eliminates two important potential confounds related to
the critiques of Plott and Zeiler (2005, 2007) and Ericson and Fuster (2011). First, subjects are randomized to
being buyers or sellers. Hence, if an object will be taken away from one person with a specified probability,
it will be given to someone else, limiting subjects’ ability to make value inferences about the objects in
question. Second, subjects are forced to consider the alternative object even if they hope to keep their
endowment because, with a fixed probability, the alternative object will be theirs.
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a host of behaviors in consumer choice, including individual failures to correctly predict the
endowment effect (Loewenstein and Adler, 1995; Van Boven et al., 2003). Given our robust-
ness results, one should not conclude that all of our subjects are completely biased. When
focusing attention on the forced exchange mechanism, our effects for buyers are consistent
with the direction of the KR prediction. Interestingly, the extent of projection bias implied
by the magnitude of their price adjustment is quite comparable to the extent of projection
bias found in real-world buyers (Conlin et al., 2007). Salience (Bordalo et al., 2012a) may
also play an important role in causing projection bias. In the case of sellers, this appears to
induce full projection bias, hinting at a special role for possession of the object.
Previous studies have tested different aspects of expectation-based reference dependence
in the context of the exchange behavior. Ericson and Fuster (2011) and Heffetz and List
(2014) manipulate the probability with which subjects will be permitted to exchange. The
results are mixed: while Ericson and Fuster (2011) find that lower permission probabilities
increase the tendency to keep the object, Heffetz and List (2014) do not find a significant
impact of the same manipulation in a substantially larger sample. There is a key distinction
between our analysis of probabilistic forced exchange and this probabilistic permission to
exchange. In section 2, we show two important facts about such experiments: First, not
responding to the permission to exchange is fully compatible with PE. Second, only indi-
viduals who wish to exchange can be affected by this experimental manipulation, but these
individuals would fail to deliver the endowment effect to begin with. Hence, manipulating
the permission to exchange does not deliver a sharp test of the KR model in the context of
endowment effects. In addition to these exchange experiments, several broad implications of
the KR model have also been tested in the realm of effort choice. Abeler et al. (2011) and
Gill and Prowse (2012) find evidence supporting the basic idea that earnings expectations
affect effort choices. This work is encouragingly suggestive of the KR model but carries
no information with respect to the point predictions for behavior made under the models’
5
equilibrium concepts.8
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic frame-
work and derives the testable predictions. Section 3 presents the design of our experiments
and details its procedures. Section 4 presents the main results and tests various aspects of
their robustness. Section 5 is a discussion and conclusion.
2 The Theoretical Background
In this section we consider exchange behavior in the KR model. We analyze exchange asym-
metries with and without forced exchange probabilities. Throughout, attention is given to
the possibility of supporting exchange asymmetries under the KR model’s rational expecta-
tions equilibrium concepts.
2.1 Preferences and Personal Equilbrium
The KR model establishes a reference-dependent utility function, U(F |G), which evaluates
a distribution of consumption outcomes, F , in comparison to a distribution of possible
reference points, G. The outcomes of F are consumption vectors, c, while the outcomes of
G are reference point vectors, r. Hence, the Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) model establishes
this utility as the expectation
U(F |G) =
∫ ∫
u(c|r)dF (c)dG(r),
For our purposes, we consider utility over two dimensions, mugs, m, and money, y, such that
c = (m, y) and r = (rm, ym). The value m ∈ {0,M} indicates the consumption utility of
having no mug or one mug and y is the utility from income available for other consumption.
The values rm and ry correspond to the reference utility outcomes for mugs and money,
8Further, in this realm, too, the predictions do not appear robust to various generalizations (Gneezy et
al., 2013).
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respectively.9 Following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006), we assume separability across dimensions
and a specific functional form of reference dependence applied equally across dimensions10
such that
u(c|r) = u(m, y|rm, ry) = m+ y + µ(m− rm) + µ(y − ry),
where
µ(z) =
 ηz if z ≥ 0ηλz if z < 0,
The parameter η represents the value of changes from the reference point and λ corresponds
to the degree of loss aversion.11
With these preferences in hand, Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) provide an elegant formulation
for analyzing the consistency of choice through the notion of personal equilibrium. Consider
a choice set, D, composed of lotteries, F , over consumption outcomes c = (m, y).
Personal Equilibrium (PE): A choice F ∈ D, is a personal equilibrium if
U(F |F ) ≥ U(F ′|F ) ∀ F ′ ∈ D.
When considering F as the reference distribution, the decision-maker prefers to consume F
as a consumption distribution over any other consumption distribution F ′. The coincidence
of the reference and consumption distributions in a PE provides a sense in which the model
follows rational expectations. In a PE, the decision-maker can only expect as the reference
9This structure assumes linear utility for income because we consider only small changes in endowments,
with expected negligible income effects.
10The assumption of a global gain-loss function is made for both tractability and discipline in Kőszegi
and Rabin (2006). In our context, it delivers clear symmetries in expected behavior across conditions. The
comparative statics, however would be maintained if one allowed the shape of the gain-loss function to vary
across goods.
11For ease of explication we primarily discuss this piece-wise linear gain-loss function. Importantly, the
central personal equilibrium predictions and comparative statics are maintained when we consider more
general functional forms. Appendix A.1.1 provides the detail.
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point something he will consume given that he expects it.
2.2 The Endowment Effect in Personal Equilibrium
Consider a potential seller of a mug, who we will assume has reference point (rm, ry) =
(M, 0).12 We assume the reference point (M, 0) as it is the one most conducive to generating
an endowment effect. That is, we posit a seller who ‘expects’ not to sell. She contemplates
both keeping the mug, yielding consumption outcome (m, y) = (M, 0), and selling the mug
at a given price, x, yielding consumption outcome (m, y) = (0, x). She can support keeping
the mug in PE provided
u(M, 0|M, 0) ≥ u(0, x|M, 0),
or
M ≥ (1 + η)x− ηλM.13
Solve for the highest price at which the seller can support keeping the mug in PE as
xsell =
(1 + ηλ)
1 + η
M.
Similarly, consider a potential buyer of a mug, who we will assume has reference point
(rm, ry) = (0, x).
14 We assume the reference point (0, x) as it is the one most conducive
to generating an endowment effect. That is, we posit a buyer who ‘expects’ not to buy.
12This assumed reference point normalizes non-sales income to 0. The assumption of the seller’s reference
point initially being (rm, ry) = (M, 0) only serves to ease the explication. The possibility of supporting the
seller keeping the mug in a PE is independent of this initial statement.
13The utility values are
u(M, 0|M, 0) = M + 0 + ηλ(M −M) + ηλ(0− 0) = M,
and
u(0, x|M, 0) = 0 + x+ ηλ(0−M) + η(x− 0) = (1 + η)x− ηλM.
14This reference point assumes non-purchase income of x. This effectively assures no income effects in
exchange. The assumption of the buyer’s reference point initially being (rm, ry) = (0, x) only serves to ease
the explication. The possibility of supporting the buyer keeping his money in a PE is independent of this
initial statement.
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He contemplates both keeping his money, yielding consumption outcome (m, y) = (0, x),
and purchasing the mug at price x, yielding consumption outcome (m, y) = (M, 0). He can
support keeping his money in PE provided
u(0, x|0, x) ≥ u(M, 0|0, x),
or
x ≥ (1 + η)M − ηλx.15
Solve for the lowest price at which the buyer can support keeping his money in PE as
xbuy =
(1 + η)
1 + ηλ
M.
The critical insight from this development is that for λ > 1,
xbuy =
(1 + η)
1 + ηλ
M < M < xsell =
(1 + ηλ)
1 + η
M,
indicating an endowment effect can exist in PE. In the KR model at the consumption value,
M , if λ > 1 it is a PE for sellers not to sell and for buyers not to buy. Note that in
the standard model of consumer behavior without reference-dependent preferences, buyers
choose to buy at all prices less than or equal to M while sellers choose to sell at all prices
greater than or equal to M .16 Hence, reference-dependent preferences as posed in the KR
model can reduce market exchange relative to the standard model.
It is important to note that the endowment effect in PE is constructed from conditions
15The utility values are
u(0, x|0, x) = 0 + x+ ηλ(0− 0) + ηλ(x− x) = x,
and
u(M, 0|0, x) = M + 0 + η(M − 0) + ηλ(0− x) = (1 + η)M − ηλx.
16This is also the case for agents without loss aversion, λ = 1, in the formulation above.
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most likely to support it. Buyers hold a reference point of not buying, sellers hold a reference
point of not selling. Given these reference expectations, they both fulfill them in their
personal equilibrium choices. Buyers forecast the sensations of losses associated with buying
and sellers forecast the sensation of losses associated with selling. Both avoid these losses
by avoiding exchange. One could imagine a buyer who held a reference point of buying and
a seller who held a reference point of selling, but these individuals would fail to produce an
endowment effect and be uninteresting for our analysis.
Prior applications of KR preferences to exchange experiments make use of an equilibrium
refinement in KR, Preferred Personal Equilibrium (PPE), in which ex-ante utility values for
PE choices are compared to select among a potential multiplicity of equilibria (Ericson and
Fuster, 2011; Heffetz and List, 2014). Importantly, the endowment effect itself does not
survive this refinement.17 Hence, though the PPE refinement does usefully apply to the
experimental paradigms of Ericson and Fuster (2011) and Heffetz and List (2014), it is
perhaps of limited use for the study of endowment effects. In sub-section 2.3 we discuss
further differences between our analysis and this prior research.
2.3 Probabilistic Forced Exchange
Having demonstrated the possibility of an endowment effect in the KR formulation, we now
consider probabilistic forced exchange. Buyers and sellers are told that with probability, p,
exchange will be forced. Mugs will be confiscated from sellers, a price x will be confiscated
from buyers, and transactions will occur. Under KR, probabilistic forced exchange generates
a stochastic reference point for all market participants. Buyers and sellers must hold as
possible reference points both mug and money each with a certain probability. As these
probabilities shift, so too do attitudes towards exchange.
17Consider the possibility that a buyer holding on to his money, (0, x), and a seller holding on to his
mug, (M, 0), are both supportable PE. The PPE refinement compares the utility values, u(0, x|0, x) and
u(M, 0|M, 0). Absent the pathological case of equality, one must yield a higher valuation and be selected as
the refined choice by both buyers and sellers. Hence, in PPE exchange asymmetries of buyers holding on to
their money and sellers holding on to their mugs cannot be rationalized.
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Consider a seller facing forced exchange probability, p, at a given price, x. She now holds
the reference distribution under forced exchange, G(rm, ry) = p · (0, x)+ (1− p) · (M, 0). She
contemplates keeping her mug, inducing the consumption distribution F (m, y) = p · (0, x) +
(1− p) · (M, 0); or selling her mug, inducing the degenerate distribution F (m, y) = 1 · (0, x).
She can support not selling, and trying to keep her mug in PE provided
U(p · (0, x)+(1−p) · (M, 0)|p · (0, x)+(1−p) · (M, 0)) ≥ U(1 · (0, x)|p · (0, x)+(1−p) · (M, 0)),
or
px+ (1− p)M + p(1− p)η(1− λ)(M + x) ≥ x+ (1− p)η(x− λM).18
Solve for the highest price at which the seller can support not selling the mug in PE as
xsell(p) =
(1 + p(1− λ)η + ηλ)
(1− p(1− λ)η + η)
M.
The important insight is that in the interval of forced exchange p ∈ [0, 1], xsell(p) is strictly
decreasing. The maximum price at which a seller can support not selling the mug is decreas-
ing as one increases the forced exchange probability. Hence, her attitudes towards exchange
are more favorable the more likely it is she is forced to exchange.
Consider a buyer facing forced exchange probability, p, at a given price, x. He now holds
18Specifically, the utility values are
U(p · (0, x) + (1− p) · (M, 0)|p · (0, x) + (1− p) · (M, 0)) = p
[
x+ (1− p) {ηλ(0−M) + η(x− 0)}+ p {ηλ(0− 0) + ηλ(x− x)}
]
+(1− p)
[
M + (1− p) {ηλ(M −M) + ηλ(0− 0)}+ p {η(M − 0) + ηλ(0− x)}
]
= px+ (1− p)M + p(1− p)η(1− λ)(M + x),
and
U(1 · (0, x)|p · (0, x) + (1− p) · (M, 0)) =
x+ (1− p) {ηλ(0−M) + η(x− 0)}
+p {ηλ(0− 0) + ηλ(x− x)}
= x+ (1− p)η(x− λM).
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as the reference distribution under forced exchange, G(rm, ry) = p · (M, 0) + (1− p) · (0, x).
He contemplates keeping his money, inducing the consumption distribution F (m, y) = p ·
(M, 0)+(1−p)·(0, x); or purchasing the mug, inducing the degenerate distribution F (m, y) =
1 · (M, 0). He can support not buying and trying to keep his money in PE provided
U(p ·(M, 0)+(1−p) ·(0, x)|p ·(M, 0)+(1−p) ·(0, x)) ≥ U(1 ·(M, 0)|p ·(M, 0)+(1−p) ·(0, x)),
or
pM + (1− p)x+ p(1− p)η(1− λ)(M + x) ≥ M + (1− p)η(M − λx).19
Solve for the lowest price at which the buyer can support not buying the mug in PE as
xbuy(p) =
(1− p(1− λ)η + η)
1 + p(1− λ)η + ηλ
M
Note that xbuy(p) is strictly increasing in the interval p ∈ [0, 1]. The minimum price at
which a buyer can support not buying is increasing as one increases the forced exchange
probability. Hence, his attitudes towards exchange are more favorable the more likely it is
he is forced to exchange.
There is a key distinction between the analysis of probabilistic forced exchange and
probabilistic permission to exchange. Ericson and Fuster (2011) and Heffetz and List (2014)
19Specifically, the utility values are
U(p · (M, 0) + (1− p) · (0, x)|p · (M, 0) + (1− p) · (0, x)) = p
[
M + (1− p) {ηλ(0−M) + η(x− 0)}+ p {ηλ(0− 0) + ηλ(x− x)}
]
+(1− p)
[
x+ (1− p) {ηλ(M −M) + ηλ(0− 0)}+ p {η(M − 0) + ηλ(0− x)}
]
= pM + (1− p)x+ p(1− p)η(1− λ)(M + x),
and
U(1 · (M, 0)|p · (M, 0) + (1− p) · (0, x)) =
M + (1− p) {η(M − 0) + ηλ(0− x)}
+p {ηλ(M −M) + ηλ(0− 0)}
= M + (1− p)η(M − λx).
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both consider probabilistic permission of exchange by endowing subjects with an object, a
university pen, and examining whether they are willing to exchange for another object, a
university mug, under varying probability of exchange permission. Individuals holding a
reference point of keeping their object (that is, those individuals that deliver the endowment
effect in KR) are unaffected by the permission to trade.20 Further, individuals who have
sufficiently strong preferences for the mug instead of the pen, will trade in any PE and not
be affected by the manipulation.21 Hence, manipulating the permission to exchange does not
generate a sharp test of KR: not responding to the permission to exchange is fully consistent
with PE. Furthermore, the permission to exchange only influences individuals who wish to
exchange and so would not deliver an endowment effect to begin with.
We also differ from Ericson and Fuster (2011) in the equilibrium concept we use for our
tests. They focus their analysis on the refined KR equilibrium concept Preferred Personal
Equilibrium, PPE. In addition to the fact that the standard endowment effect does not sur-
vive this refinement, in our setup of forced exchange, PPE even predicts a reverse endowment
effect for any p > 0 (see Appendix A.1.3 for detail). Our strategy is to only use properties
20In a mug-pen exchange environment, let up be the consumption utility of a pen and um be the con-
sumption utility of a mug. Under probabilistic permission of exchange, q, a person endowed with a pen
may hold as a reference point either keeping the pen (up, 0) or exchanging when permitted to do so
q · (0, um) + (1− q) · (up, 0). The PE supporting keeping the object is unaffected by q. To see this note
U(up, 0|up, 0) ≥ U(q · (0, um) + (1− q) · (up, 0)|up, 0) ⇒
up ≥ q · [um + η(um − 0) + ηλ(0− up)] + (1− q) · up ⇒
up ≥ [um + η(um − 0) + ηλ(0− up)] ⇒
up ≥
1 + η
1 + ηλ
um,
is independent of the probability, q.
21The individual can support attempting to exchange in PE, for λ > 1, provided
U(q · (0, um) + (1− q) · (up, 0)|q · (0, um) + (1− q) · (up, 0)) ≥ U(up, 0|q · (0, um) + (1− q) · (up, 0)) ⇒
qum + (1− q)up + q(1− q)η(1− λ)(um + up) ≥ up + q[ηup − ηλum] ⇒
q ≥ (1 + ηλ)up − (1 + η)um
η(λ− 1)(um + up)
.
Note that if up ≤ 1+η1+ηλum, exchange is supportable for all q ∈ [0, 1] in PE and if up ≥
1+ηλ
1+η um, exchange is
not supportable for any q ∈ [0, 1]. When combined with the above equilibrium condition on not exchanging,
this development implies that if an individual cannot support keeping his object in PE, up <
1+η
1+ηλum, he
can support exchanging at any probability.
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of the broader set of PEs, thus making our test more conservative in terms of the conditions
we impose on optimal behavior.
2.4 Behavioral Predictions
Both buyers and sellers become more favorable towards exchange the more likely it is they
are forced to exchange. This leads to three key theoretical implications upon which our
experimental design is predicated.22
Implication 1: No endowment effect at p = 0.5. One cannot support an endowment effect in
PE at forced exchange probability 0.5 as
xsell(0.5) =
1 + 0.5(1− λ)η + ηλ
1− 0.5(1− λ)η + η
M =
xbuy(0.5) =
1− 0.5(1− λ)η + η
1 + 0.5(1− λ)η + ηλ
M
= M.
With p = 0.5, when considering the consumption value of the mug as the price, x = M ,
sellers cannot support not selling and buyers cannot support not buying in PE. Given
that we examine the environment most conducive to endowment effects, this is a critical
observation. The intuition for this effect is simple. A buyer and seller with forced exchange
probability 0.5 are indistinguishable except for their label, both can expect to consume
either a mug with probability 0.5 or money with probability 0.5. Both hold as their reference
point 0.5 · (M, 0) + 0.5 · (0, x), and so both have equal valuations when contemplating the
value of engaging in exchange.
Implication 2: Reverse endowment effect for p > 0.5. Note that xsell(p) is strictly decreasing
22We showcase once more the piece-wise linear case for the reference-dependent consumption, a generalized
version may be found in Appendix A.1.2.
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in p, while xbuy(p) is strictly increasing in p. Combining these facts with Implication 1 implies
xsell(p) < M < xbuy(p) for p > 0.5.
The intuition is again simple. For p > 0.5, a buyer’s reference point even in the situation
most conducive to the endowment effect consists of a high probability of receiving the mug.
Given the expectation of having the mug, he’s actually quite willing to pay for it, increasing
xbuy(p) to above the consumption value, M . A similar logic reduces xsell(p) for the seller
below the consumption value, M . The condition xbuy(p) > xsell(p) is what we term a reverse
endowment effect.
Implication 3: Complementary Symmetry. In the environment most conducive to generating
an endowment effect, a seller under forced exchange probability, p, holds as her reference
point p · (0, x) + (1− p) · (M, 0). Similarly, a buyer under forced exchange probability, 1− p,
holds as his reference point p · (0, x)+(1−p) · (M, 0). This leads to the following observation
xsell(p) =
(1 + p(1− λ)η + ηλ)
(1− p(1− λ)η + η)
M = xbuy(1− p) = (1− (1− p)(1− λ)η + η)
1 + (1− p)(1− λ)η + ηλ
M.
A buyer with forced exchange probability 1− p should have xbuy(1− p) exactly equal to the
value of xsell(p) for a seller with forced exchange probability p. Both hold as their reference
point p · (0, x) + (1− p) · (M, 0), and so both have equal valuations when contemplating the
value of engaging in exchange.
Transitioning from our three theoretical implications to behavioral predictions requires
a mapping from xsell(p) and xbuy(p) to real statements on buyer and seller valuations. We
make the assumption that for all prices greater than xbuy(p), the buyer chooses not to buy,
following the PE most conducive to generating endowment effects. At prices below xbuy(p),
we assume the buyer chooses to buy, such that xbuy(p) precisely identifies Willingness To
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Pay (WTP).23 Similarly, we assume that for all prices less than xsell(p), the seller chooses
not to sell, following the PE most conducive to generating endowment effects. At prices
above xsell(p), we assume the seller chooses to sell, such that xsell(p) precisely identifies
Willingness To Accept (WTA).24 In Appendix Section A.1.4 we relax this assumption and
analyze the possibility that the method of choice interacts with the elicitation of buyer and
seller valuations.
3 Experimental Setup
We conduct a market exchange experiment in a large first year introductory economics class
at the University of Lausanne. The design follows closely the setup of Kahneman et al.
(1990) with the critical innovation of introducing a probability of forced exchange.
In an initial sample of 465 students, subjects were separated by the middle aisle of a large
classroom into a group of buyers (N=236) and a group of sellers (N=229).25 All students
were given a package of instructions and at the same time every student in the group of
sellers had a university mug placed on the desk in front of them. The instructions described
the content, tasks and payments of the experiment. Sellers (buyers) were told that they were
now in possession of a university mug (CHF 10 ≈ USD 10) which they could potentially sell
(use to buy a mug). Participants were described the market price determination mechanism
and were exhorted to reveal their true valuations.
23Indeed, for prices below xbuy(p) it is a PE for buyers to hold a reference point of buying and doing so.
To see this note the PE condition for such behavior would be
U(M, 0|M, 0) ≥ U((1− p)(0, x) + p(M, 0)|M, 0) ⇒
x ≤ 1 + ηλ
1 + η
M.
Note that
1 + ηλ
1 + η
M ≥ xbuy(p) = (1− p(1− λ)η + η)
1 + p(1− λ)η + ηλ
M ∀ p ∈ [0, 1],
such that for any potential price x ≤ xbuy(p) the inequality for the above PE condition will be satisfied.
24The logic is identical to that for buyers above.
25We have no prior reason to believe that people sitting on one versus the other side would have different
consumption values for the traded objects or different levels of reference-dependence.
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Subjects were assigned at random to one of four different forced exchange probabilities,
p ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75}, by providing them with a different packet of instructions. Hence, all
four markets were conducted at the same time.26 Subjects were told that upon realization of
the market price, a random number between 1 and 100 would be drawn. If this number was
between 1 and p, they would be forced to sell (buy) a mug at the market price irrespective of
their price responses. If the forced exchange occurred, they would receive the market price
in exchange for their mug (receive a mug and pay the market price).
Once the price determination mechanism and forced exchange probability had been ex-
plained, participants indicated at which price they would be willing to sell (buy) a mug on
a separate page listing prices from CHF 0.50 to CHF 10 in CHF 0.50 increments. Appendix
section A.2 provides translated instructions.
A total of 40 students from higher years assisted the implementation of the experiment.
Once all questionnaires were completed, the assistants entered all answers into a spreadsheet
in order to compute market prices and to prepare payments. In the meantime, the usual
lecture was held in the classroom. Shortly before the end of the lecture all participants
received payments and mugs according to the outcome of the experiment.27
4 Results
We begin by examining behavior in our baseline condition without forced exchange, p = 0.
The first row of Table 1 provides the mean and median valuations for buyers and sellers,
a t-test of their difference, and a Mann-Whitney test for equality of the two distributions
for the 120 subjects assigned to the p = 0 condition. Clear from Table 1 is the existence of
substantial endowment effect, with sellers’ Willingness To Accept (WTA) exceeding buyers’
Willingness To Pay (WTP) by around CHF 2.51 (robust s.e. = 0.44). Sellers have an average
26Any potential concerns about mistaken market power or subjects’ beliefs about the other side of the
market are alleviated by our close replication of these initial results with subjects facing a random price
mechanism. See section 4.1 for details.
27An anonymous identification sheet was handed with the instructions to ensure the correct attribution
of payments and mugs.
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WTA of CHF 6.96 (0.31) while buyers have an average WTP of only CHF 4.45 (0.31). The
difference between the two groups’ average valuations is significant, t = 5.71, (p < 0.01), and
a Mann-Whitney test also rejects the null hypothesis of equal distributions, z = 5.31, (p <
0.01). This first result confirms the usual finding in the endowment effect literature (Knetsch
and Sinden, 1984; Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman et al., 1990), where sellers’ WTA consistently
exceeds buyers’ WTP.
Table 1: Valuations in Primary Experiment
Forced Exchange Sellers Buyers WTA WTP WTA-WTP t-test MW-test
Probability # # (s.e) (s.e) (s.e) (p-value) (p-value)
p = 0 60 60 6.96 4.45 2.51 5.71 5.31
(0.31) (0.31) (0.44) (p<0.01) (p<0.01)
p = 0.25 60 60 7.06 3.65 3.41 9.03 7.22
(0.37) (0.25) (0.38) (p<0.01) (p<0.01)
p = 0.5 60 55 6.40 3.73 2.67 5.98 5.32
(0.33) (0.34) (0.45) (p<0.01) (p<0.01)
p = 0.75 56 54 7.07 4.08 2.99 7.23 6.02
(0.33) (0.24) (0.41) (p<0.01) (p<0.01)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. WTA = Seller’s Willingness To Accept. WTP = Buyer’s
Willingness To Pay. t-test for equality in means. MW-test for equality in distributions.
Having established a baseline endowment effect, we test the main behavioral predictions
generated by our three theoretical implications. The KR model predicts that seller’s valua-
tions should decrease and buyers’ valuations should increase as forced exchange probabilities
increase in the set p ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75}. Further, buyers’ and sellers’ valuations should be
equal under forced exchange probability p = 0.5, the endowment effect should reverse for
p > 0.5, and buyers and sellers in complementary conditions should have identical valuations.
Figure 1 presents mean valuations corresponding to Table 1, testing these implications.28
Result 1: Endowment effect at p = 0.5.
Figure 1 documents a substantial endowment effect for p = 0.5. Sellers’ WTA exceeds
buyers’ WTP by CHF 2.67 (robust s.e. = 0.45). This differential valuation is significantly
28Figure A1 provides the distributions of valuations for buyers and sellers in the primary experiment.
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Figure 1: Mean Valuations with Forced Exchange
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different from 0, t = 5.98, (p < 0.01).29 Hence, we reject Implication 1 of the KR
development that exchange asymmetries are eliminated at p = 0.5.
Result 2: No reverse endowment effect at p > 0.5.
The endowment effect of Figure 1 is maintained at p = 0.75. Sellers’ WTA exceeds
buyers’ WTP by CHF 2.99 (robust s.e. =0.41). This value differs significantly from 0,
t = 7.23, (p < 0.01), and we clearly reject the null hypothesis that this value is negative.30
Hence, we reject Implication 2 of the KR development that the endowment effect reverses
for p > 0.5.
Result 3: No complementary symmetry.
29A Mann-Whitney test for equality of distributions also rejects the null hypothesis of equal distributions,
z = 5.32, (p < 0.01).
30A Mann-Whitney test for equality of distributions also rejects the null hypothesis of equal distributions,
z = 6.02, (p < 0.01).
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In Table 2 we regress valuations on an indicator for being a seller in the three symmetry
groups where buyers and sellers face complementary probabilities. The KR model predicts
equal valuations across these three groups. In each case sellers’ WTA exceeds buyers WTP
by between CHF 2.67 - 3.42. For all three cases we reject at the 1% level the null hypothesis
that buyers and sellers in complementary conditions have identical valuations. Hence, we
reject Implication 3 of the KR development for complementary symmetry.
Table 2: Formal test of KR symmetry predictions
Dependent Variable: Sellers’ WTA or Buyers’ WTP
Seller, p = 0.75 Seller, p = 0.50 Seller, p = 0.25
Buyer, p = 0.25 Buyer, p = 0.50 Buyer, p = 0.75
Seller (0 or 1) 3.424*** 2.667*** 2.978***
(0.411) (0.446) (0.381)
Constant 3.650*** 3.733*** 4.080***
(0.239) (0.250) (0.244)
N 114 115 116
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** indicates sig-
nificance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
4.1 Robustness Tests
Our market exchange experiments demonstrate a significant and persistent endowment ef-
fect. Under the KR model, if individuals behave according to the rational expectations PE
concept, the endowment effect should be sensitive to probabilistic forced exchange. We de-
velop three core predictions for the KR model under PE, related to this sensitivity. All three
predictions are rejected in the data.
Before drawing conclusions from these results, we present a series of robustness tests,
calling upon data from an additional 465 subjects. These robustness tests explore the pos-
sibility that particular design details such as the order in which information was presented
or the method of price determination influenced behavior. There has been substantial dis-
cussion as to the robustness of the endowment effect to deviations in experimental design
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(Plott and Zeiler, 2005, 2007). Hence, our additional results speak to potential confounds
presented in this literature as well.
4.1.1 Mechanism First Treatment
One potentially important design element is the order in which instructions are received. In
our initial setup, a mug was distributed to each seller right at the beginning of the experiment
together with the instructions. Participants thus received the mug before having learned
about the forced exchange mechanism. Though prima-facie this seems a minor detail, it
may indeed influence behavior as individuals may focus their attention disproportionately
on the element that is presented first. Indeed, Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) intuited such a
first-focus view of the reference point :
Specifically, a person’s reference point is her probabilistic beliefs about the rele-
vant consumption outcome held between the time she first focused on the decision
determining the outcome and shortly before consumption occurs. (Kőszegi and
Rabin, 2006, p. 1141)
If reference points are influenced by such first-focus in our experiment, we may be reject-
ing the predictions of the KR model simply because subjects did not attend to the forced
exchange mechanism.
In order to eliminate this confounding factor, we change the timing of the experiment to
help ensure subjects focus on probabilistic forced exchange. The design coincides exactly with
our primary experiment except that we first distributed the instructions to the participants
without showing or mentioning the mug. Sellers’ instructions stated that they were going to
receive an object and they would need to indicate their willingness to accept. For buyers the
instructions said that they had 10 CHF and they would need to indicate their willingness
to pay for the object that the other participants were going to receive. As the purpose was
to draw attention to the probabilistic forced exchange mechanism, we conducted only the
markets with p ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}, leaving out the baseline condition of p = 0. The remainder
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of the experiment was unchanged. Appendix section A.2 provides translated instructions.
The participants in this Mechanism First treatment were 228 first year law students at the
University of Lausanne with 118 (110) serving as sellers (buyers).
4.1.2 Random Price Treatment
The second robustness check serves to overcome potential problems of differing price expec-
tations of buyers and sellers as well as strategic behavior in price indications. Differences
in price expectations between buyers and sellers could have affected their stated valuations
(Mazar et al., 2014).31 Another issue discussed in the endowment effect literature is the
possibility that individuals may mistakenly try to exert market power despite being price
takers (Plott and Zeiler, 2007).32 Both of these factors could lead to an endowment effect
and could lead it to persist even as forced exchange probabilities are varied.
We address these potential issues by substituting market price determination with ran-
dom price determination. The setup of this Random Price treatment was identical to the
Mechanism First treatment with one minor modification. The text that previously explained
the market price formation was replaced with text reflecting that the price for the object
would be determined at random between CHF 0.50 and CHF 10. Appendix section A.2
provides translated instructions. This random price determination eliminates market power
and equalizes buyer and seller price expectations.
We conducted markets with p ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.99}, adding a condition with forced
exchange probability of p = 0.99 to verify behavior at the extremes of forced exchange.
Participants for the Random Price treatment were recruited from the ORSEE participant
pool for experiments at the University and the Ecole Polytechnique of Lausanne (Greiner,
2004). We ran 17 lab sessions with a total of 237 participants, 118 (119) of whom served as
sellers (buyers).
31For example, if sellers had more optimistic price expectations than buyers, this may have increased their
relative valuations, delivering an endowment effect.
32This could deliver an endowment effect with buyers understating their valuations and sellers overstating
their valuations in a mistaken attempt to take advantage of the other side of the market.
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4.1.3 Results from Robustness Tests
Table 3 provides the results of our robustness tests.33 Both for the Mechanism First and
the Random Price treatments, sellers’ WTA generally exceeds buyers’ WTP. For the p = 0.5
conditions, we find significant endowment effects of between CHF 1.69 (robust s.e = 0.54)
and CHF 2.05 (0.47), closely corroborating our initial findings. This rejects Implication
1 from our theoretical development. For the p > 0.5 conditions, we do not find that the
endowment effect reverses (though it is somewhat diminished in the Mechanism First treat-
ment). This rejects Implication 2 from our theoretical development. Further, Table A2
provides complementary symmetry tests following those conducted in Table 2. We reject
the KR complementary symmetry predictions of Implication 3 for all comparisons. These
results compellingly demonstrate the robustness of our findings. When focusing attention
on the probabilistic forced exchange mechanism and when using random price determina-
tion, we continue to reject the central implications of the KR model’s rational expectations
equilibrium formulation.
One interesting feature of our robustness results that warrants attention is the directional
findings from the Mechanism First treatment. Though sellers’ WTA is relatively stable
across treatments, buyers appear to respond to changing probabilities, increasing their WTP
by around CHF 0.7 for each 25 percentage point increase in forced exchange probability.
Increasing forced exchange from p = 0.25 to p = 0.75 increases buyers’ WTP by CHF 1.40
(robust s.e. = 0.47) and we reject the null hypothesis that mean WTP is equal across the two
conditions, t = 2.94, (p < 0.01).34 This apparent sensitivity to forced exchange probability
is directionally consistent with the KR model. However, given a baseline endowment effect
of around CHF 2.50 and recognizing that sellers are effectively stable in their valuations,
33Figure A3 provides a summary graphic for behavior across conditions and Figure A1 provides the
distributions of valuations for buyers and sellers in the robustness tests.
34A Mann-Whitney test for equality of distributions also rejects the null hypothesis of equal distributions,
z = 2.78, (p < 0.01). Interestingly, for the random price treatment we get a qualitatively similar pattern of
increasing valuations for buyers, though this appears to be driven by the p = 0.99 condition, and we get a
pattern of increasing valuations for sellers as well. Given the differences in the subject pools, we hesitate to
interpret this result.
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Table 3: Valuations in Robustness Tests
Forced Exchange Sellers Buyers WTA WTP WTA-WTP t-test MW-test
Probability # # (s.e) (s.e) (s.e) (p-value) (p-value)
Panel A: Mechanism First Treatment
p = 0.25 40 35 5.99 3.24 2.74 5.91 4.89
(0.32) (0.33) (0.46) (p<0.01) (p<0.01)
p = 0.5 40 39 6.03 3.97 2.05 4.34 4.25
(0.33) (0.34) (0.47) (p<0.01) (p<0.01)
p = 0.75 38 36 5.41 4.64 0.77 1.64 1.58
(0.32) (0.34) (0.47) (p=0.10) (p=0.11)
Panel B: Random Price Treatment
p = 0.25 29 27 5.21 2.98 2.23 3.52 3.58
(0.49) (0.40) (0.63) (p<0.01) (p<0.01)
p = 0.5 40 40 4.88 3.19 1.69 3.15 3.22
(0.39) (0.37) (0.54) (p<0.01) (p<0.01)
p = 0.75 28 29 5.66 2.91 2.75 5.95 4.95
(0.37) (0.27) (0.46) (p<0.01) (p<0.01)
p = 0.99 21 23 6.21 4.09 2.13 3.33 3.35
(0.53) (0.35) (0.64) (p<0.01) (p<0.01)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. WTA = Seller’s Willingness To Accept. WTP = Buyer’s
Willingness To Pay. t-test for equality in means. MW-test for equality in distributions.
the extent of sensitivity (CHF 1.40 reduction in endowment effect for a 50 percentage point
increase in forced exchange probability) is only about half of what the model predicts.35
5 Conclusion
An important advance in the study of potentially reference-dependent behavior is the dis-
cipline provided by structured mechanisms for determining the reference point. Kőszegi
35The CHF 2.50 baseline endowment effect from our initial experiment should be reduced to 0 when
moving from p = 0 to p = 0.5. Extrapolating from the treatment differences between p = 0.25 and p = 0.75
(and recognizing that seller’s valuations remain stable) would yield a reduction to CHF 2.50−1.40 = 1.10 or
a reduction of around 56%. This simple exercise assumes that all reduction in the endowment effect should
come from buyers who forecast the stable valuations they would have as mug owners and assumes that buyer
valuations are linear in forced exchange probability.
24
and Rabin (2006) provide such discipline by positing a reference point grounded in rational
expectations. The key construct in this development is that individuals rationally forecast
their sensations of gains and losses and build consistent plans accordingly. This behavior is
summarized in the rational expectations equilibrium concept, personal equilibrium, which
states an individual can only expect to consume something that he will consume given he
expects it.
We examine the predictions of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) personal equilibrium in the
context of market experiments with probabilistic forced exchange. Sellers endowed with
university mugs and buyers endowed with money have their valuations elicited as in standard
exchange experiments, but with one critical innovation. With probability p, exchange is
forced at the market price regardless of stated preferences. This innovation generates a
dilemma: buyers and sellers can no longer avoid losses by not engaging in exchange. This
reduces personal equilibrium behavior of not exchanging, making individuals more favorable
to exchange the higher the probability that exchange will be forced. This mechanism has
the potential to eliminate and even reverse the commonly-found endowment effect exchange
asymmetry (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman et al., 1990).
In a series of experiments with forced exchange, our results uniformly reject the pre-
dictions of the Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) model’s personal equilibrium concept. Sellers’
valuations exceed buyers’ valuations under all probabilities of forced exchange. In robust-
ness tests where attention is drawn specifically to the forced exchange mechanism, the results
are directionally more promising for buyers, but still reject the main thrust of the theoretical
predictions. The endowment effect exists and persists.
Reference-dependent preferences remain the leading rationale for exchange asymmetries
such as the endowment effect. Given that Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) is, at its core, a model
of reference dependence, our results are consistent with this core feature. Our results are
inconsistent with the rational expectations equilibrium concept that requires individuals to
forecast their future sensations of gains and losses and build consistent plans accordingly.
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The notion of rational expectations personal equilibrium is a key contribution of Kőszegi
and Rabin (2006) and key to the model’s application.36 Without personal equilibrium, the
reference point is less disciplined, returning the model to one largely resembling standard
reference dependence. What then can be a path forward, potentially incorporating the
important insights of the Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) framework?
One natural path forward is suggested by our robustness tests, demonstrating results
that are directionally consistent with the Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) model. As opposed
to personal equilibrium, one could imagine a consumer who is unable to fully forecast his
sensations of gain and loss when developing his plan of action. Anticipating the effect of
probabilistic forced exchange requires individuals to explore these sensations in the different
possible states of the world with different possible reference points. In many contexts,
individuals have proven to have only incomplete ability to predict how different states affect
their utility, a regularity that Loewenstein et al. (2003) call ”projection bias.” In the domain
of consumer behavior, evidence exists that projection bias affects decisions (Read and van
Leeuwen, 1998). Further, Loewenstein and Adler (1995) and Van Boven et al. (2003) show
that individuals also fail to fully predict the endowment effect, or are substantially affected
by the duration of posession of the good in question (Strahilevitz and Loewenstein, 1998).
Generally, projection bias is argued to push behavior towards what would be chosen in the
current state.37
In our setting, such projection bias has a natural prediction. Buyers fail to completely
forecast their sensations of gains and losses when considering the state where they are forced
to buy, and thus have a mug, biasing their valuations towards those of the current state
where they have money.38 This failure to forecast would naturally reduce the sensitivity of
valuations to changes in forced exchange probability. Interestingly, Conlin et al. (2007) show
36Pagel (2012, 2013); Heidhues and Kőszegi (2004, 2008); de Meza and Webb (2007); Herweg et al. (2010)
all use personal equilibrium in the development of model results.
37Bordalo et al. (2012b) argue that salience may be an important moderator of projection bias.
38Note that the current state coincides with the state where they are not forced to buy under the conditions
most conducive to the endowment effect as developed in section 2.
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that consumers are unduly influenced by the current state (the temperature) in their buying
decision (of winter clothes). Their estimates suggest that projection bias is about one half
for these consumers. Incidentally, our buyers’ increase in valuation due to forced-exchange is
about half of what it should be, given the endowment effect in the baseline condition. This
may suggest a similar magnitude in projection bias.
Though future work is required to explore these issues in more depth, projection bias
as a failure of fully rational expectations may be a promising avenue for new research in
expectations-based reference dependence.
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A Appendix: Not For Publication
A.1 Additional Theoretical Considerations
A.1.1 Personal Equilibrium with general µ-function
It is straightforward to show that keeping the mug is a PE for sellers also with a more generic
function for the reference dependent utility that respects the property: µ(Z)− µ(−Z) < 0.
To show this, consider the following argumentation for a mug seller:
U((M, 0)|(M, 0)) = M + µ(0)
U((0, x)|(M, 0)) = x+ µ(−M) + µ(x)
Keeping the mug is hence a PE if:
U((M, 0)|(M, 0)) ≥ U((0, x)|(M, 0))
M − µ(−M) ≥ x+ µ(x)
which with M = x implies µ(−x) + µ(x) < 0, and hence xsell > M , for any degree of loss
aversion. Along the same lines can be shown that not buying is a PE for buyers for any
degree of loss aversion.
A.1.2 Personal Equilibrium with general µ-function and probabilistic forced
exchange
We can generalize the results from 2.4 using the same generic µ-function as above. It is a
PE for sellers to keep the mug as long as:
U(p · (0, x) + (1− p) · (M, 0)|p · (0, x) + (1− p) · (M, 0)) =
p
[
x+ (1− p) {µ(−M) + µ(x)}+ pµ(0)
]
+ (1− p)
[
M + (1− p)µ(0) + p {µ(M) + µ(−x)}
]
and
U(1 · (0, x)|p · (0, x) + (1− p) · (M, 0)) =
x+ (1− p) {µ(−M) + µ(x)}+ pµ(0)
Not selling is a PE as long as the first expression exceeds the second:
p
[
x+ (1− p) {µ(−M) + µ(x)}
]
+ (1− p)
[
M + p {µ(M) + µ(−x)}
]
≥
x+ (1− p) {µ(−M) + µ(x)}
M + p {µ(M) + µ(−x)} − (1− p) {µ(−x) + µ(x)} ≥ x
Assuming again x = M :
1
p {µ(x) + µ(−x)}+ (1− p) {µ(−x) + µ(x)} ≥ 0
2p(µ(x) + µ(−x)) ≥ µ(x) + µ(−x)
since µ(x) + µ(−x) < 0 this leads us to the following three conditions for the predicted
endowment effect:
2p < 1 ⇔ p < 0.5 xsell > M, there is an endowment effect for p < 0.5.
2p = 1 ⇔ p = 0.5 xsell = M, there is no endowment effect for p = 0.5.
2p > 1 ⇔ p > 0.5 xsell < M, there is a reverse endowment effect for p > 0.5.
The argumentation for buyers is analogous to that for sellers.
A.1.3 Preferred Personal Equilibrium Refinement
The Preferred Personal Equilibrium (PPE) refinement compares all possible PE and selects
the one yielding the highest ex-ante utility. A mug seller has two PE strategies: trying
to hold onto her mug or choosing to sell it. PPE thus compares the consumption utilities
U(p · (0, x) + (1− p) · (M, 0)|p · (0, x) + (1− p) · (M, 0)) and U((0, x)|(0, x)). From previous
derivation we know that the former PE yields:
px+ (1− p)M + p(1− p)η(1− λ)(M + x).
The latter utility simply equals x. This PE does not trigger any gain-loss sensations since
the seller may choose to sell her mug independently of p. Comparing both utilities yields:
px+ (1− p)M + p(1− p)η(1− λ)(M + x) T x
which, if we assume x = M , clearly delivers:
(1− pη(λ− 1)) ≤ (1 + pη(λ− 1))
Due to the absence of sensations of gains and losses, U((0, x)|(0, x)) is the equilibrium
that is selected as PPE. The endowment effect hence does not survive the PPE refinement.
Instead, a reverse endowment effect with WTP lying above WTA is predicted for any p > 0.
A.1.4 PE in Price List Lottery
Previous analyses looked at PE for a given price. We now extend these arguments to let
valuations interact with the method of choice. If individuals form valuations on a price list
from which the valid price is drawn using a uniform distribution, the price itself becomes a
lottery which influences expectations of trade.
For the sake of demonstration, we consider a simplified price list with just three possible
prices and assume the existance of a ∆ big enough such that at price x−∆ a buyer wants
to buy the mug under Strategy S. Where S = {buy, not buy, not buy} and the deviation
2
strategy S ′ = {buy, buy, not buy}. This leads to the following buying pattern:
not buy buy
x−∆ S, S’
x S S’
x+∆ S, S’
Each column occurs with a probability of 1
3
.
We only compare behavior under S and S ′ at price x when agents are not forced to
exchange, all remaining terms are identical and cancel out at the equilibrium analysis. Utility
of not buying the mug at price x given his reference point is S
U(S|S) =1
3
[−ηλM + η(x−∆)] + 1
3
p(−ηλM + ηx) + 1
3
p(−ηλM + η(x+∆))
Utility of buying the mug at price x given his reference point is S
U(S ′|S) = M − x− 1
3
ηλ∆+
1
3
(1− p)(ηM − ηλx) + 1
3
[(1− p)(ηM − ηλx) + pη∆]
The lowest price at which the buyer can support not buying the mug in PE is
x(1 +
2
3
pη +
1
3
η +
2
3
(1− p)ηλ) = M(1 + 2
3
(1− p)η + 2
3
pηλ+
1
3
ηλ) + ∆η
1
3
(λ− 1)
xbuy(p) = M
1 + 2
3
(1− p)η + 2
3
pηλ+ 1
3
ηλ
1 + 2
3
pη + 1
3
η + 2
3
(1− p)ηλ
−∆1
3
η
(λ− 1)
1 + 2
3
pη + 1
3
η + 2
3
(1− p)ηλ
A similar argumentation for sellers yields the following as the highest price at which she
can support not selling the mug in PE:
xsell(p) = M
1 + 2
3
(1− p)ηλ+ 2
3
pη + 1
3
η
1 + 2
3
pηλ+ 1
3
ηλ+ 2
3
(1− p)η
+∆
1
3
ηp
(λ− 1)
1 + 2
3
pηλ+ 1
3
ηλ+ 2
3
(1− p)η
The comparative statics remain unchanged. The forced exchange makes buyers and
sellers more inclined towards exchange, the price list merely amplifies the effects. A reverse
endowment effects is already predicted at p = 0.5 with xbuy(p) > xsell(p) ∀ λ > 1.
A.2 Translated Instructions
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Primary Experiment – Buyers 
 
 
 
Before passing on to the exercise session, you will participate in an experiment. 
 
 
Please read all instructions given on this page attentively. 
 
 
From now on, it is strictly forbidden to talk to your colleagues. It is important for 
the good course of the experiment that you respect this rule. If you have a question, 
please raise your hand to address one of the assistants. If you do not respect this rule, 
we have to exclude you from the experiment. 
 
 
A. What is it about? 
 
You now have 10CHF at your disposal for this experiment. This money is yours. 
You can use all or part of this money to buy an UNIL mug, like the ones half of the 
participants have (you may also see one on the projector). On the next page, you will 
need to indicate at which price you are willing to buy an UNIL mug. At the same time, 
the participants that have a mug will indicate at which price they are willing to sell it.  
 
We will use your choice and the choices of the other participants to determine the market 
supply and demand curves. The market price will be determined by the intersection of 
supply and demand of all buyers and sellers in this market. 
 
 
How exchanges will be made : 
 
• If you chose to buy a mug at the market price, this amount will be 
deducted from your 10CHF and you will receive a mug. You will equally 
receive what is left from your 10CHF.  
 
• Moreover, a number between 1 and 100 will be randomly drawn. If this number 
lies between 1 and 25, you will be forced to buy a mug at the market price. This 
exchange is mandatory. There is thus a 25% chance that you will be 
forced to buy a mug at the market price whether this is according to your 
indicated choice or not at this price. 
 
 
The experiment consists of one single round. So, think carefully about your choice. Keep 
in mind that you have all interest to respond in accordance with your preferences as you 
do not have any influence on the market price that will later be revealed. 
 
 
  
	  
	  
 
	  
	  
	  
B. Decision sheet 
 
This is the course of the experiment : 
 
• You have 10CHF at your disposal. This money is yours. You may use all or 
part of this money to buy an UNIL mug, like the ones half of the participants have.  
 
• If you chose to buy a mug at the market price, this amound will be 
deducted from your 10CHF and you will receive a mug. You will equally 
receive what is left from your 10CHF.  
 
 
• Moreover, a number between 1 and 100 will be randomly drawn. If this number 
lies between 1 and 25, you will be forced to buy a mug at the market price. This 
exchange is mandatory. There is thus a 25% chance that you will be 
forced to buy a mug at the market price whether this is according to your 
indicated choice or not at this price. 
 
IMPORTANT : Mark a choice for each line, otherwise your decision sheet will be invalid.  
 
 
 
 
I prefer keeping 
my money 
 
I prefer buying 
a mug 
1 If the market price is 0.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
2 If the market price is 1CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
3 If the market price is 1.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
4 If the market price is 2CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
5 If the market price is 2.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
6 If the market price is 3CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
7 If the market price is 3.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
8 If the market price is 4CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
9 If the market price is 4.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
10 If the market price is 5CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
11 If the market price is 5.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
12 If the market price is 6CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
13 If the market price is 6.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
14 If the market price is 7CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
15 If the market price is 7.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
16 If the market price is 8CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
17 If the market price is 8.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
18 If the market price is 9CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
19 If the market price is 9.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
20 If the market price is 10CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
	  	  
	  
 
	  
	  
	  
Primary Experiment – Sellers 
 
 
 
Before passing on to the exercise session, you will participate in an experiment. 
 
 
Please read all instructions given on this page attentively. 
 
 
From now on, it is strictly forbidden to talk to your colleagues. It is important for 
the good course of the experiment that you respect this rule. If you have a question, 
please raise your hand to address one of the assistants. If you do not respect this rule, 
we have to exclude you from the experiment. 
 
 
A. What is it about? 
 
You have received an UNIL mug for this experiment. This mug is yours. You may 
sell your mug for money to one of the participants that did not receive one. On the next 
page, you will need to indicate at which price you are willing to sell your UNIL mug. At 
the same time, participants that did not receive a mug will indicate at which price they 
are willing to buy a mug. 
  
We will use your choice and the choices of the other participants to determine the market 
supply and demand curves. The market price will be determined by the intersection of 
supply and demand of all buyers and sellers in this market. 
 
 
How exchanges will be made : 
 
• If you chose to sell your UNIL mug at the market price, you will receive 
this amount in exchange for your mug that will you then no longer have.  
 
• Moreover, a number between 1 and 100 will be randomly drawn. If this number 
lies between 1 and 25, you will be forced to sell your mug at the market price. 
This exchange is mandatory. There is thus a 25% chance that you will be 
forced to sell the mug at the market price whether this is according to 
your indicated choice or not at this price. 
 
 
  
The experiment consists of one single round. So, think carefully about your choice. Keep 
in mind that you have all interest to respond in accordance with your preferences as you 
do not have any influence on the market price that will later be revealed. 
 
  
	  	  
	  
 
	  
	  
	  
B. Decision sheet 
 
This is the course of the experiment : 
 
• You have received an UNIL mug for this experiment. This mug is yours. 
You may sell your mug for money to one of the participants that did not receive 
one. 
 
• If you chose to sell your UNIL mug at the market price, you will receive 
this amount in exchange for your mug that will you then no longer have.  
 
• Moreover, a number between 1 and 100 will be randomly drawn. If this number 
lies between 1 and 25, you will be forced to sell the mug at the market price. This 
exchange is mandatory. There is thus a 25% chance that you will be 
forced to sell the mug at the market price whether this is according to 
your indicated choice or not at this price. 
 
IMPORTANT : Mark a choice for each line, otherwise your decision sheet will be invalid.  
 
 
 
 
I prefer keeping 
the mug 
 
I prefer selling  
the mug 
1 If the market price is 0.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
2 If the market price is 1CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
3 If the market price is 1.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
4 If the market price is 2CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
5 If the market price is 2.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
6 If the market price is 3CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
7 If the market price is 3.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
8 If the market price is 4CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
9 If the market price is 4.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
10 If the market price is 5CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
11 If the market price is 5.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
12 If the market price is 6CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
13 If the market price is 6.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
14 If the market price is 7CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
15 If the market price is 7.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
16 If the market price is 8CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
17 If the market price is 8.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
18 If the market price is 9CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
19 If the market price is 9.50CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
20 If the market price is 10CHF, … ¡ ¡ 
	  	  
	  
 
	  
	  
	  
Mechanism First with Random Price – Buyers 
 
 
 
Please read all instructions given on this page attentively. 
 
 
From now on, it is strictly forbidden to talk to your colleagues. It is important for 
the good course of the experiment that you respect this rule. If you have a question, 
please raise your hand to address one of the assistants. If you do not respect this rule, 
we have to exclude you from the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
A. What is it about? 
 
Without counting your show-up fee of 10CHF for your participation, you now 
have 10CHF at your disposal for this experiment. This money is yours. You can 
use all or part of this money to buy an object, like the one half of the participants will 
receive in a moment. As a next step, you will need to indicate at which price you are 
willing to buy the object. At the same time, the participants that will have received the 
object will indicate at which price they are willing to sell it.  
 
Next, the price of the object will be determined through a random draw. It will lie 
between 0,50CHF and 10CHF. You thus cannot influence this price. You may only decide 
if, at a given price, you prefer buying the object or keeping your money. 
 
 
 
How exchanges will be made : 
 
• If you chose to buy the object at the drawn price, this amount will be 
deducted from your 10CHF and you will receive the object. You will equally 
receive what is left from your 10CHF.  
 
• Moreover, a number between 1 and 100 will be randomly drawn. If this number 
lies between 1 and 25, you will be forced to buy the object at the drawn price. 
This exchange is mandatory. There is thus a 25% chance that you will be 
forced to buy the object at the drawn price whether this is according to 
your indicated choice or not at this price. 
 
 
 
The experiment consists of one single round. So, think carefully about your choice. Keep 
in mind that you have all interest to respond in accordance with your preferences as you 
do not have any influence on the market price that will later be revealed. 
 
 
	  	   	  
	  
 
	  
	  
	  
Mechanism First with Random Price – Sellers 
 
 
 
Please read all instructions given on this page attentively. 
 
 
From now on, it is strictly forbidden to talk to your colleagues. It is important for 
the good course of the experiment that you respect this rule. If you have a question, 
please raise your hand to address one of the assistants. If you do not respect this rule, 
we have to exclude you from the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
A. What is it about? 
 
In a few moments you are going to receive an object for this experiment. This 
object will be yours. You may sell your object for money to one of the participants that 
did not receive one. As a next step, you will need to indicate at which price you are 
willing to sell your object. At the same time, participants that did not receive an object 
will indicate at which price they are willing to buy one. 
 
Next, the price of the object will be determined through a random draw. It will lie 
between 0,50CHF and 10CHF. You thus cannot influence this price. You may only decide 
if, at a given price, you prefer keeping or selling the object for money.  
 
 
 
 
How exchanges will be made : 
 
• If you chose to sell your object at the drawn price, you will receive this 
amount in exchange for your object that will you then no longer have.  
 
• Moreover, a number between 1 and 100 will be randomly drawn. If this number 
lies between 1 and 25, you will be forced to sell your object at the drawn price. 
This exchange is mandatory. There is thus a 25% chance that you will be 
forced to sell your object at the market price whether this is according to 
your indicated choice or not at this price. 
 
 
 
The experiment consists of one single round. So, think carefully about your choice. Keep 
in mind that you have all interest to respond in accordance with your preferences as you 
do not have any influence on the market price that will later be revealed. 
 
A.3 Additional results
Table A1 is a quantile regression version of Table 2. It confirms that our results are not
driven by mass points or truncation at the extremes of the price distributions.
As further evidence of our results not being driven by mass points in the extremes of the
price distribution, Figures A1 and A2 show that the distributions of buyers’ and sellers’ val-
uations are overall distinct from each other. Extreme responses were present in our primary
experiment but were not the driving factor of the persistence of the endowment effect. In
our robustness tests, Figure A2, extreme responses have been almost fully eliminated and
our main results continue to hold.
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Table A1: Quantile regression of KR symmetry predictions
Dependent Variable: Sellers’ WTA or Buyers’ WTP
Seller, p = 0.75 Seller, p = 0.50 Seller, p = 0.25
Buyer, p = 0.25 Buyer, p = 0.50 Buyer, p = 0.75
Seller (0 or 1) 3.000*** 3.000*** 3.000***
(0.519) (0.765) (0.532)
Constant 4.000*** 4.000*** 4.000***
(0.347) (0.553) (0.379)
N 114 115 116
Notes : Standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** indicates significance
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Figure A2:
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Figure A3:
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